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Ending the Invalidity Shell Game: 
Stabilizing the Application of the Written 
Description Requirement in Patent 
Litigation 
Aaron B. Rabinowitz* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
With the recent battles fought over whether particular 
inventions are patent-eligible,1 one might be forgiven for 
overlooking the other requirements for patentability. The 
written description requirement mandates that the 
specification of the patent application shall “contain a written 
description of the invention,”2 which 
[A]llows the United States Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) to 
examine applications effectively; courts to understand the invention, 
determine compliance with the statute, and to construe the claims; 
and the public to understand and improve upon the invention and to 
avoid the claimed boundaries of the patentee’s exclusive rights.3 
While issued patents are presumed valid and can only be 
invalidated upon a showing of clear and convincing evidence,4 
                                                          
© 2011 Aaron B. Rabinowitz. 
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the Honorable Franklin S. Van Antwerpen, United States Court of Appeals for 
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 1. E.g., In re Bilski, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (June 28, 2010) (assessing 
patentability of methods of hedging investment risk); Ass’n for Molecular 
Pathology v. USPTO, 09-CV-4515, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 35418 (S.D.N.Y. 
Apr. 2, 2010) (assessing patentability of breast cancer genes). 
 2. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006); see also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 
598 F.3d 1336, 1345–51 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (affirming that 35 U.S.C. § 
112 contains a written description requirement separate from the enablement 
and best mode requirements). 
 3. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1345. 
 4. E.g., Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 
Rabinowitz AB. Ending the Invalidity Shell Game: Stabilizing The 
Application of the Written Description Requirement in Patent Litigation. 
Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology. 2011;12(1):127-149. 
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nearly half of all litigated patents are nonetheless adjudged 
invalid.5 An analysis of federal court patent decisions issued in 
the last ten years reveals that those (typically accused 
infringers) who challenge issued patents on the ground of 
insufficient written description succeed more than forty percent 
of the time in their challenges.6 
The fact that the federal courts so frequently overturn 
granted patents that (1) have been thoroughly vetted by the 
PTO and (2) can only be invalidated by a showing of clear and 
convincing evidence7 underscores that there is a disconnect 
between the way in which the PTO evaluates—and approves—
patent applications and the way in which those approved 
patents are treated in litigation.8 
This has created what can be termed a “shell game” for 
patentees that assert their patents in litigation. Having 
confidence in their PTO-approved patent claims, patentees bet 
on the strengths of those patents by initiating litigation against 
infringers, only to discover in litigation that their patents are 
invalid based on written descriptions that the PTO concluded 
were sufficient. 
The causes of this problem are likely at least twofold. First, 
the law of written description is ever-evolving, and there is still 
internal debate within the Federal Circuit regarding the scope 
                                                          
1375 (Fed. Cir. 1986); see also 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2006) (establishing a 
presumption of patent validity). 
 5. Alan Devlin, Revisiting the Presumption of Patent Validity, 37 SW. U. 
L. REV. 323, 326 n.10 (2008) (citing Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, 
Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 76 (2005)). While patents may be 
invalidated for any number of reasons (e.g., lack of novelty, obviousness, 
failure to disclose best mode), this paper focuses on the issue of patents 
invalidated for failure to comply with the written description requirement of 
35 U.S.C. § 112. 
 6. This analysis is based on summary patent litigation statistics for 
2000–2009, available at www.patstats.org. See infra section IV. 
 7. E.g., Hybritech, 802 F.2d at 1375; see also 35 U.S.C. § 282 
(establishing a presumption of patent validity). 
 8. This 40% figure is also in tension with suggestions that the written 
description doctrine has not had much of an impact on patent litigation. E.g., 
Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger?: A 
Comprehensive Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the 
Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 80 (2007); see also Dennis F. 
Crouch, An Empirical Study of the Role of the Written Description Requirement 
in Patent Prosecution, 104 NW. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 382, 383 (2010) 
(observing that written description requirement plays little role in patent 
prosecution before the PTO). 
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and purpose of the requirement.9 Second, courts may encounter 
difficulty in applying the presumption of validity in the 
litigation context because the PTO need not necessarily explain 
how a given patent claim satisfied the written description 
requirement.10 While the disconnect between the PTO and the 
courts may have more than one cause, the fact that courts 
frequently agree with patent challengers suggests that courts 
are implicitly applying an incorrect evidentiary standard. 
This disconnect is a matter of importance to both patentees 
and to the public. First, the frequency with which courts apply 
the written description requirement to overturn patents stands 
as a clear disincentive for firms to invest in patentable research 
that may benefit the public. Second, the frequent invalidation 
of patents on some grounds (i.e., written description) that was 
necessarily evaluated by the PTO11 suggests that the PTO’s 
evaluation of patent applications is flawed. 
This paper examines this disconnect and proposes a 
solution to harmonize the application of the written description 
requirement at the PTO and in the courts. This solution 
empowers patent applicants and the PTO to more consistently 
produce patents that possess claims that satisfy the written 
description requirement and are more likely to be upheld in 
litigation. 
To frame the issues surrounding the current state of the 
law on written description, Part II of this paper reviews the 
evolution of the written description requirement from its 
origins as a device to prevent applicants from adding improper 
“new matter” to their patent claims to its current incarnation 
as a device used to invalidate patent claims that lack sufficient 
support in the specification. A statistical review of federal court 
decisions issued from 2000–2009 that apply the written 
                                                          
 9. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Univ. 
of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1325 (Linn, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe 
Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc); see also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 
1336, 1361–67 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 10. Because written descriptions are presumed to be adequate, examiners 
need only comment on the written description when they believe it is deficient. 
See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) § 2163.04, available at 
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/mpep.htm. 
 11. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104 (2006); MPEP § 2163(II)(A)(2). 
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description requirement is provided in Part IV of this paper, 
which demonstrates the prevalence of written description 
issues in patent litigation. 
Part V of this paper proposes a way to harmonize the 
PTO’s written description analysis of patent applications with 
the way in which the federal courts assess the written 
description of granted patents, namely by having patent 
applicants affirmatively identify during prosecution the written 
description support for their claims. Part V of this paper also 
discusses the likely benefits of this solution and some of the 
solution’s likely criticisms. Finally, Part VI of this paper 
provides additional commentary and observations on the state 
of written description law. 
II. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
REQUIREMENT 
The written description doctrine carries the same weight in 
patentability determinations as any of the other three 
requirements for patentability.12 But because the contours of 
the written description have changed over time, compliance 
with the requirement presents a puzzle for patent applicants 
and the courts alike. 
The written description requirement originated as a device 
to prevent patent applicants from adding new inventions to an 
already-existing disclosure.13 In more recent decisions, 
however, the Federal Circuit has changed course and applied 
the written description requirement as a tool to protect against 
inadequate disclosure. In this new incarnation, the written 
description is applied to claims, including originally-filed 
claims, to assess whether the patent specification adequately 
discloses or supports the subject matter recited in the claims.14 
 
 
                                                          
 12. 35 U.S.C. §§ 101–03, 112 (2006). 
 13. See Univ. of Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1307 (Rader, J., dissenting) 
(collecting cases). 
 14. E.g., LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336, 
1347 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (concluding that originally-filed claims lacked written 
description support). 
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A. HISTORY OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT 
As the Federal Circuit recently reiterated: 
[T]he purpose of the written description requirement is to “ensure 
that the scope of the right to exclude, as set forth in the claims, does 
not overreach the scope of the inventor’s contribution to the field of 
art as described in the patent specification.” It is part of the quid pro 
quo of the patent grant and ensures that the public receives a 
meaningful disclosure in exchange for being excluded from practicing 
an invention for a period of time.15 
At the outset of modern patent law, the doctrine was used 
to police priority.16 During the early development of the patent 
law, 35 U.S.C. § 132 was used to enforce the prohibition against 
adding material to patent claims that was not present in the 
originally-filed application: “[n]o amendment shall introduce 
new matter into the disclosure of the invention.”17 The Federal 
Circuit then adapted 35 U.S.C. § 112 to police priority in In re 
Ruschig.18 
In Ruschig, the applicant added a new claim to the 
application about a year after the application was filed.19 The 
court then determined whether the new claim was supported 
by the disclosure in the applicant’s original application.20 
Instead of using § 132 to police this priority question, however, 
the Ruschig court applied § 112 to analyze priority and “calved” 
a new written description doctrine out of the enablement 
requirement of § 112.21 
In In re Wertheim,22 the court again addressed a priority 
issue. Applying the written description doctrine, the court 
reiterated that “[t]he function of the description requirement is 
to ensure that the inventor had possession, as of the filing date 
of the application relied on, of the specific subject matter later 
claimed by him.”23 In later cases, the U.S. Court of Customs 
                                                          
 15. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1353–54 (Fed. 
Cir. 2010) (internal citations omitted) (quoting Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. 
Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 920 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); Holman, supra note 8, at 4–
6. 
 16. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 976–89 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 17. 35 U.S.C. § 132 (2006). 
 18. In re Ruschig, 379 F.2d 990 (C.C.P.A. 1967). 
 19. Id. at 991. 
 20. Id. at 992–96. 
 21. Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 978 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 22. In re Wertheim, 541 F.2d 257 (C.C.P.A. 1976). 
 23. Id. at 262. 
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and Patent Appeals and then the Federal Circuit continued to 
apply the written description requirement only for purposes of 
policing priority.24 
B. REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA V. ELI LILLY, 
INCORPORATED—CREATING A “FREE-STANDING DISCLOSURE 
REQUIREMENT” 
In Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly, 
Incorporated,25 however, the Federal Circuit applied the 
written description requirement not to police priority, but 
instead as a “new free-standing disclosure requirement.”26 
In Lilly, the claims at issue recited recombinant plasmids 
and microorganisms that produce human insulin, which is 
protein involved in the regulation of sugar metabolism.27 One of 
the claims at issue recited “a nucleotide sequence having the 
structure of the reverse transcript [i.e., cDNA] of an mRNA of a 
[human], which mRNA encodes insulin.”28 The specification, 
however, provided “only a general method for obtaining the 
human cDNA (it incorporates by reference the method used to 
obtain the rat cDNA) along with the amino acid sequences of 
human insulin A and B chains.”29 The court concluded that, 
whether or not that disclosure was enabling, the general 
disclosure regarding rat insulin “[did] not provide a written 
description of the cDNA encoding human insulin . . . .”30 Judge 
Lourie explained that the cDNA described in the specification 
was: 
[N]ot itself a written description of that DNA; it conveys no 
distinguishing information concerning its identity. While the example 
provides a process for obtaining human insulin-encoding cDNA, there 
                                                          
 24. See In re Kaslow, 707 F.2d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“The test for 
determining compliance with the written description requirement is whether 
the disclosure of the application as originally filed reasonably conveys to the 
artisan that the inventor had possession at that time of the later claimed 
subject matter, rather than the presence or absence of literal support in the 
specification for the claim language.”); see also Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 
978–80 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 25. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly, Inc., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 
1997). 
 26. Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 980 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc). 
 27. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1562. 
 28. Id. at 1567 (second alteration in original). 
 29. Id. 
 30. Id. 
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is no further information in the patent pertaining to that cDNA’s 
relevant structural or physical characteristics; in other words, it thus 
does not describe human insulin cDNA. Describing a method of 
preparing a cDNA or even describing the protein that the cDNA 
encodes, as the example does, does not necessarily describe the cDNA 
itself. No sequence information indicating which nucleotides 
constitute human cDNA appears in the patent . . . .31 
Because the specification lacked such sequence information, 
the Federal Circuit held the claim invalid.32 The Lilly 
patentee’s other claims generically recited cDNA encoding 
vertebrate insulin (claims 1 and 2), cDNA encoding mammalian 
insulin (claim 4), and cDNA encoding vertebrate insulin (claims 
6 and 7).33 The patentee argued that the disclosure of a species 
(the rat insulin-encoding cDNA) within the scope of those 
generic claims satisfied the written description requirement.34 
The court, however, disagreed: 
[A] description of rat insulin cDNA is not a description of the broad 
classes of vertebrate or mammalian insulin cDNA. A written 
description of an invention involving a chemical genus, like a 
description of a chemical species, ‘requires a precise definition, such 
as by structure, formula, [or] chemical name,’ of the claimed subject 
matter sufficient to distinguish it from other materials.35 
This result was notable for at least two reasons. First, the 
Federal Circuit had applied the written description 
requirement—historically used to prevent applicants from 
later-claiming matter not included in the original 
application36—to the patentee’s originally-filed claims.37 
Second, the biotechnology community was also concerned about 
the “stringent disclosure requirements” the decision had 
imposed on biotechnology inventions.38 
The free-standing disclosure requirement developed in 
Lilly and its subsequent application by the Federal Circuit in 
Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc.,39 University of Rochester 
                                                          
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. U.S. Patent No. 4,652,525 col.20 l.64 (filed June 28, 1983). 
 34. Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567. 
 35. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Fiers v. Revel, 984 F.2d. 1164, 
1171 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
 36. See supra Part II.A. 
 37. Holman, supra note 8, at 14. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo I), 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. 
Cir. 2002) (applying Lilly and concluding that a deposit of DNA material did 
not satisfy the written description requirement for claim directed to a DNA 
sequence, when the application did not contain a written recitation of the 
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v. G. D. Searle, Inc.,40 and LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Resource 
Mapping, Inc.41 generated significant tension among the 
Federal Circuit’s judges. Each of those cases applied the Lilly 
approach to written description to invalidate claims for lack of 
sufficient disclosure in the patent specification.42 In each of 
these three cases, the patentee petitioned for rehearing en 
banc, and rehearing was denied in all three cases over vigorous 
dissents from Judges Gajarsa, Linn, and Rader.43 The Lilly 
approach to written description quickly expanded beyond the 
complex biotechnology invention at issue in that case. The 
“free-standing” disclosure requirement has since been applied 
outside of biotechnology to fields such as medical devices,44 
computer graphics,45 and beverage cans.46 
 
                                                          
sequence). After Enzo petitioned for panel rehearing, the Enzo I panel vacated 
its original decision and remanded for analysis of whether a patentee could 
comply with the written description requirement if the deposits “indicate that 
the patentee has invented species sufficient to constitute the genera.” Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956, 967–70 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
 40. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
 41. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 424 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 
2005). 
 42. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 
2009), aff’d en banc 598 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (Linn, J., concurring); 
LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 
2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); Univ. of 
Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, 
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1325 (Linn, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); MOBA, B.V. v. Diamond 
Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Rader, J., concurring); 
id. at 1327 (Bryson, J., concurring); Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 976 (Rader, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 987 (Linn, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 43. LizardTech, 433 F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc); Univ. of Rochester, 375 F.3d at 1307 (Rader, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc); id. at 1325 (Linn, J., dissenting from denial 
of rehearing en banc); Enzo Biochem, 323 F.3d at 976 (Rader, J., dissenting 
from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 44. ICU Med., Inc. v. Alaris Med. Sys., Inc., 558 F. 3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 
2009). 
 45. LizardTech, 424 F.3d 1336. 
 46. Crown Packaging Tech. v. Rexam Beverage Can Co., 531 F. Supp. 2d 
629 (D. Del. 2008). 
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C. ARIAD PHARMACEUTICALS47—REAFFIRMING LILLY 
While the Federal Circuit seemed to retract the Lilly 
doctrine in Enzo II,48 the court ultimately affirmed in Ariad 
that the written description requirement could be used to police 
priority and–—as in Lilly–—could also be used to invalidate 
claims for lack of supporting disclosure in the specification.49 
The patent claims at issue in Ariad concerned the use of 
reducing the activity of the NF-kB transcription factor present 
in cells to regulate the expression of genes (e.g., genes that code 
for cytokines, which can harm the body if present in excess 
amounts).50 The patent specification recited the goal of 
reducing NF-kB activity and reducing the binding between NF-
kB and NF-kB binding sites in cells.51 The specification 
“hypothesize[d] three types of molecules with the potential to 
reduce [NF-kB] activity in cells: decoy, dominantly interfering, 
and specific inhibitor molecules.”52 A panel decision invalidated 
Ariad’s claims on the ground that the specification did not 
actually describe the molecules that reduced the binding 
between the NF-kB molecules and the NF-kB binding sites.53 
On Ariad’s petition for rehearing, the en banc Federal 
Circuit granted the petition to determine whether 35 U.S.C. § 
112 contained a “written description requirement separate from 
the enablement requirement and, if so, the scope and purpose 
of that requirement.”54 
Before turning to the merits of the case,55 Judge Lourie 
noted that while the written description requirement had 
historically been used to police priority: 
Ariad provides no principled basis for restricting that requirement to 
establishing priority. Certainly nothing in the language of § 112 
supports such a restriction; the statute does not say ‘[t]he 
specification shall contain a written description of the invention for 
purposes of determining priority.’ And although the issue arises 
                                                          
 47. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 48. See supra note 39 and accompanying text. 
 49. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349. 
 50. Id. at 1340. 
 51. Id. at 1341. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009), 
aff’d en banc 598 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 54. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1340. 
 55. The Ariad en banc court ultimately determined that the written 
description requirement exists separately from the enablement requirement, 
an issue which is outside the scope of this paper. 
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primarily in cases involving priority, Congress has not so limited the 
statute, and neither will we.56 
Judge Lourie also took the opportunity to address the long-
standing test for written description, namely that the 
description must “clearly allow persons of ordinary skill in the 
art to recognize that [the inventor] invented what is claimed.”57 
Put another way, the accepted test was whether “the disclosure 
of the application relied upon ‘reasonably conveys to [those 
skilled in the art] that the inventor had possession at that time 
of the later claimed subject matter.’”58 
Acknowledging that “[t]he term ‘possession,’ however, has 
never been very enlightening,”59 Judge Lourie then concluded 
that: 
[W]hatever the specific articulation, the test requires an objective 
inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective 
of a person of ordinary skill in the art. Based on that inquiry, the 
specification must describe an invention understandable to that 
skilled artisan and show that the inventor actually invented the 
invention claimed.60 
The en banc court then adopted, in full, the reasoning of the 
earlier panel decision and affirmed the invalidity of Ariad’s 
claims for failure to comply with the written description 
requirement.61 
Judges Rader and Linn dissented from the Ariad en banc 
opinion.62 The dissenting judges first criticized the majority’s 
reaffirmation of the “fabrication,” begun in Lilly, that written 
description was not limited to policing new matters and was 
instead a free-standing requirement.63 The dissenting judges 
also rightly criticized the Ariad-Lilly application of written 
description as “in tension” with the Federal Circuit’s approach 
to claim construction.64 
In claim construction, claims are read “in view of the 
                                                          
 56. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1349. 
 57. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 58. Id. (quoting Ralston Purina Co. v. Far-Mar-Co, Inc., 772 F.2d 1570, 
1575 (Fed. Cir. 1985)). 
 59. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1351. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 1354. 
 62. Id. at 1361–67 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 63. Id. at 1363–64. 
 64. Id. at 1364. 
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specification” to determine their meaning and scope.65 In Judge 
Rader’s view, “If this court followed its own rule [from claim 
construction] and ensured that claims do not enlarge what the 
inventor has described, then the claims would never have a 
scope that exceeds the disclosure in the rest of the 
specification.”66 Given that under principles of claim 
construction, claims could never be construed to encompass any 
more than what is disclosed in the specification, courts would 
never find that a claim “lacks support” in the patent 
application.67 Judge Rader observed that “this court’s new 
written description doctrine only has meaning if this court 
ignores its own claim construction rules.”68 The dissent 
concluded by arguing that “[a]s it stands, the court’s 
inadequate description of its written description requirement 
acts as a wildcard on which the court may rely when it faces a 
patent that it feels is unworthy of protection.”69 
Thus, while the Ariad en banc decision clarified that the 
written description requirement could be used as a free-
standing disclosure requirement, the decision nonetheless left 
somewhat open the precise standard under which patent claims 
should be evaluated. Rather than providing bright-line 
guidance, the decision stated only that the written description 
inquiry required an “objective inquiry into the four corners of 
the specification from the perspective of a person of ordinary 
skill in the art,” leaving the analysis of an individual patent up 
to the specific facts of that case. 
III. THE PRESUMPTION OF VALIDITY AND WRITTEN 
DESCRIPTION 
Aside from the turbulence in the law of written description, 
the presumption of validity that attaches to all granted patents 
is a second layer of complexity courts confront when analyzing 
patent claims for compliance with written description.  Issued 
                                                          
 65. Id. at 1364–65 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 
(Fed. Cir. 2005)). 
 66. Id. at 1365. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Id. at 1366; see also LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 
F.3d 1373, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of 
rehearing en banc) (characterizing Federal Circuit’s approach to written 
description issues as “[b]ring your specifications to the Federal Circuit and we 
will tell you if they contain sufficient descriptions.”). 
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patents are presumed valid—a challenger cannot overturn a 
patent without showing that the patent is invalid by clear and 
convincing evidence.70 Taken literally, the presumption means 
that courts must give deference to the PTO in all cases, even 
where the court itself may disagree with the PTO’s ultimate 
conclusion on patentability: 
A patent is presumed valid and invalidity must be shown by clear and 
convincing evidence. . . . It is quite possible that [a] patent should 
have never been granted, but once it was granted, attacking its 
validity is a very difficult task indeed. . . . [T]he law is the law.71 
The presumption of validity and the attendant clear and 
convincing evidentiary standard are squarely in play when a 
challenger in litigation bases its invalidity theory on prior art 
that was already reviewed by the PTO: “[w]hen no prior art 
other than that which was considered by the PTO examiner is 
relied on by the attacker, he has the added burden of 
overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified government 
agency presumed to have properly done its job . . . .”72 Hence, 
“[w]hen an attacker simply goes over the same ground travelled 
by the PTO, part of the burden is to show that the PTO was 
wrong in its decision to grant the patent.”73 
This same analysis should also apply in the written 
description context to require courts to give proper deference to 
the PTO’s conclusions on written description. The PTO is 
obligated by rule to review the specification during prosecution 
to determine the claim’s compliance with the written 
description requirement.74 Given that the written description 
                                                          
 70. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 71. Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin Ltd., 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 48246, at *144, *150 (E.D. Va. July 17, 2006). 
 72. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, 725 F.2d 1350, 1359 (Fed. 
Cir. 1984).  Some have questioned whether the same standards should apply 
in court when the PTO did not review the evidence that a challenger is using 
to support a theory of invalidity.  In a recent petition to rehear a case en banc, 
Microsoft urged the court to overrule its precedents that require clear and 
convincing evidence of invalidity when the PTO did not consider the art at 
issue.  Lucent v. Gateway, Inc., Federal Circuit Appeal Nos. 2008-1485, -1487, 
-1495, Appellants’ Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 8–14 (filed Oct. 13, 2009) 
(on file with author); see also Doug Lichtman & Mark Lemley, Rethinking 
Patent Law’s Presumption of Validity, 60 STAN. L. REV. 45, 49–50 (2007). 
 73. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360. 
 74. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a) (2010); see also MPEP § 2163(II)(A)(2) (“[T]he 
examiner should review the claims and the entire specification, including the 
specific embodiments, figures, and sequence listings, to understand how 
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analysis encompasses only the claims and the specification,75 a 
written description-based challenge asserted in litigation could 
be considered as going “over the same ground travelled by the 
PTO . . . .”76 
Part of the challenge facing the courts, however, is that 
while the PTO must review all patent claims for compliance 
with the written description requirement,77 the PTO does not 
as a matter of course make findings regarding written 
description.78 This presents a practical problem for reviewing 
courts: when a challenger raises an issue that was considered 
by the PTO during prosecution, the challenger’s burden is to 
show that the PTO’s reasoning on that issue was incorrect and 
overcome the deference the court must give to the PTO’s 
reasoning.79 But it is difficult to see how a court can properly 
defer to the PTO’s reasoning when the PTO concludes that the 
claims satisfy written description requirements but do not 
supply express reasoning to educate the court (and the public) 
regarding precisely how the patent claims and specification 
satisfy the requirement.80 
Where the PTO does not make any findings or “[w]hen new 
evidence touching validity of the patent not considered by the 
PTO is relied on, the tribunal considering it is not faced with 
                                                          
applicant provides support for the various features of the claimed invention.”). 
 75. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009), 
aff’d en banc 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (noting that the written 
description analysis addresses only the claims and the “four corners” of the 
specification). 
 76. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360. 
 77. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a) (2010); see also MPEP § 2163(II)(A)(2). 
 78. See, e.g., PIN/NIP v. Platte Chem. Co., 304 F.3d 1225, 1243 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (“[A] patent issued by the PTO is presumed to be valid.”); Brooktree 
Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, 977 F.2d 1555, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (“[T]he 
fact that the Patent Office allows . . . an amendment without objection thereto 
as new matter (within the meaning of Title 35 U.S.C. § 132) is entitled to an 
especially weighty presumption of correctness” (citation omitted)). 
 79. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360. 
 80. See PIN/NIP, Inc. v. Platte Chem., 304 F.3d 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2002) 
(highlighting the problems that can result from the lack of express reasoning 
from the PTO. Specifically, the PTO allowed the patentee’s claims on the first 
office action, but in subsequent litigation the Federal Circuit reversed a jury 
verdict that one of the allowed claims complied with the written description 
requirement. Thus, the patentee may have been penalized in litigation for 
claims that—in the PTO’s judgment—comply with written description because 
there will be no PTO findings a court can review and defer to). Cf. Am. Hoist, 
725 F.2d at 1360 (observing that court is normally required to defer to PTO’s 
reasoning and expertise). 
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having to disagree with the PTO or with deferring to its 
judgment or with taking its expertise into account.”81 This may 
mean that courts likely have trouble appreciating that the 
written description of a granted patent can only be overturned 
by clear and convincing evidence even in the absence of any 
express findings by the PTO, which may explain why written 
description challenges so frequently go the way of the 
challenger.82 
Thus, in any given case, a court must contend with (1) the 
uncertainty in the ever-evolving law surrounding written 
description and (2) the challenge of properly considering the 
presumption of validity when the court may or may not have 
express findings from the PTO to which the court can defer. 
Given the layers of complexity surrounding written description, 
it is no surprise that the courts have encountered significant 
challenges in properly applying the requirement in litigation, 
as described in the next section of this paper. 
IV. WRITTEN DESCRIPTION—PLAYING A LEADING ROLE 
IN LITIGATION 
A. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION OUTCOMES 
IN LITIGATION 
Some commentators have suggested that the written 
description requirement does not ultimately play much of a role 
in patent validity.83 During en banc oral arguments in Ariad, 
Chief Judge Michel stated that: 
I can’t remember ever seeing a patent office rejection that was based 
only on the failure of written description. I’m not saying there aren’t 
any, but the flow of cases that come through this court at three or 
four hundred a year, it’s exceedingly rare that the patent office hangs 
its case on written description. I can’t remember a single case.84 
A follow-up study revealed that Judge Michel’s comment was 
correct.85 
                                                          
 81. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360. 
 82. See Infra Part IV. 
 83. Holman, supra note 8, at 80; see also Crouch, supra note 8, at 396 
(observing that written description requirement plays little role in patent 
prosecution before the PTO). 
 84. Recording of Oral Argument at 23:58–24:18, Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli 
Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (2010), available at 
http://oralarguments.cafc.uscourts.gov. 
 85. As detailed in the follow-up study, not one of 2,858 Board of Patent 
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In contrast to its limited effect in prosecution, written 
description has played a critical role in patent litigation. A 
review of the courts’ application of the written description 
requirement reveals strikingly different results than what is 
seen in prosecution. First, litigation statistics reveal that 
written description issues arise in a significant number of 
cases.86 A review of patent litigation data87 reveals that over 
2000–2009, parties that attacked a patent on written 
description grounds succeeded more than forty percent of the 
time (Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Success of Attack on Written Description 
Grounds 
Year88 2000
-
2004 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Average 
Challenger 
Prevails 
52% 35% 43% 25% 39% 37% 43% 
Thus, despite the fact that the PTO is obligated to assess 
the written description of a patent and that a granted patent 
can only be invalidated by a showing of clear and convincing 
evidence, parties that attacked a patent on written description 
grounds nonetheless succeed two out of every five attempts. 
This is a surprising result, given that the PTO is obligated to 
                                                          
Appeals and Inferences (BPAI) decisions sustained an outcome-determinative 
written description requirement rejection of originally-filed claims; the 
twenty-three BPAI decisions that did have an outcome-determinative written 
description decision “involved the rejection of claims that had been added or 
amended during prosecution and addressed the concern that the added 
limitations were not properly described in the original specification.” Crouch, 
supra note 8, at 394. 
 86. For example, in 2009 alone, written description issues arose in 30 
different patent litigations. U.S. PAT. LITIG. STAT., 
http://www.patstats.org/Patstats2.html (last visited July 8, 2010). 
 87. These data are from www.patstats.org, an organization at the 
University of Houston. Patstats.org provides research information on patent 
law decisions dating back to 2000, and tracks cases and outcomes on an issue-
specific basis (e.g., obviousness, infringement under the doctrine of 
equivalents). Id. 
 88. These data were calculated by reviewing statistics from 
www.patstats.org. For example, the 37% figure in 2009 was calculated by 
dividing the number of written description decisions in 2009 (11) that favored 
the patent challenger by the total number (11 + 19 = 30) of written description 
challenges in 2009, i.e., 11 / (19 + 11) = 37%. Full Calendar Year 2009 Report, 
U.S. PAT. LITIG. STAT., http://www.patstats.org/2009_full_year_posting.htm 
(last visited July 2, 2010). 
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review the claims and specification for compliance with the 
written description requirement,89 and that patent validity can 
only be disproved by clear and convincing evidence.90 
B. POSSIBLE EXPLANATIONS FOR THESE LITIGATION OUTCOMES 
That nearly half of all written description issues are 
decided in favor of the challenger suggests that courts are— 
perhaps involuntarily—operating as if the PTO’s conclusion 
that a patent claim satisfied written description can be 
overturned by a preponderance of the evidence (i.e., 51% 
probable) rather than by the applicable clear and convincing 
standard (i.e., 70% probable).91 These data suggest that (1) 
something is amiss with the written description “strength” of 
patents that the PTO is allowing, (2) the courts are 
misapplying the law of written description, (3) the courts are 
misapplying the evidentiary burdens to validity challenges, or 
(4) some combination of these.92 
Any or all of the foregoing may be the culprit for the 
current state of written description law. First, the fact that 
written description figures so infrequently into the PTO’s 
decisions to grant patentability93 may mean that the PTO itself 
is not applying enough written description scrutiny to patent 
applications. Without being “battle-tested” during prosecution, 
granted patent applications then become susceptible to written 
description challenges during litigation. 
The complexity in the law and the Federal Circuit’s own 
internal inconsistency may contribute to the challenges that 
                                                          
 89. 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(a) (2010); MPEP § 2163(II)(A). 
 90. Hybritech, Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1375 
(Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 91. United States v. Fatico, 458 F. Supp. 388, 405 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) 
(Weinstein, J.) (noting that the “clear and convincing” standard requires 70% 
probability); Note, Due Process Comes Due: An Argument for the Clear and 
Convincing Evidentiary Standard in Sentencing Hearings, 77 IOWA L. REV. 
1803, 1804 n.11 (1992). 
 92. To place the data in proper perspective, the 43% “win rate” by 
challengers means that the patentee wins on written description issues 57% of 
the time. See supra Part IV (A). This 57% figure, however, is closer to the 50% 
win rate that would be expected if the courts were applying a preponderance 
standard than to the 70% win rate that would be expected if the courts were 
applying the clear and convincing standard. See Fatico, 458 F. Supp. at 405. 
 93. Crouch, supra note 8, at 396 (observing that written description 
requirement plays little role in patent prosecution before the PTO). 
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the written description poses to litigants and judges alike 
during litigation.  First, the en banc Federal Circuit has 
recognized that the existing “possession”94 standard for 
compliance with written description has “never been very 
enlightening.”95 Thus, the contours of the test are hazy by the 
court’s own admission. Second, the fact that courts may 
construe claims to be broader than the scope of the 
specification’s preferred embodiments96 has arguably created a 
situation where courts are given “unfettered power to err 
twice—both in construing the claims so broad as to exceed the 
scope of the rest of the specification and then to invalidate 
those claims because it reads the specification as failing to 
‘support’ [the] court’s own broad conception of the claimed 
subject matter.”97 
No matter which of the foregoing is the cause of the 
problem, the end result for patentees is that their patents are 
overly susceptible to invalidation on written description 
grounds. This is of concern to the PTO and to patent applicants, 
as it is a clear disincentive for firms to invest in research that 
may be beneficial to society at large: firms may, 
understandably, become fearful that their patents may be 
invalidated in litigation. 
While the presumption of validity and the attendant “clear 
and convincing” evidentiary standard may exist, courts have 
difficulty applying the doctrine in litigation, particularly where 
there is no express reasoning by the PTO to which the court 
can defer. As a practical matter, while “[t]he court must give 
deference to the PTO’s reasoning in its decisions”98 it is 
difficult, if not impossible, to see how courts can give proper 
deference to the PTO without the court always having before it 
                                                          
 94. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2009), 
aff’d en banc 598 F.3d 1336, 1351, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (explaining the 
“possession” test as “whether the disclosure of the application relied upon 
reasonably conveys to those skilled in the art that the inventor had possession 
of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date”). 
 95. Id. 
 96. E.g., Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 358 F.3d 898, 906 (Fed. 
Cir. 2004) (“[T]his court has expressly rejected the contention that if a patent 
describes only a single embodiment, the claims of the patent must be 
construed as being limited to that embodiment.”). 
 97. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1365 (Rader, J., dissenting). 
 98. Peter Zura, Looking For Fire Amidst The Smoke - Is The Federal 
Circuit Really Exceeding Its Appellate Authority In Patent Infringement 
Cases?, 12 U. BALT. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 1, 15 (2003). 
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some express reasoning from the PTO. 
V. SOLUTION 
The above-described problems highlight the need for a 
solution that will stabilize the courts’ application of written 
description. The solution would most preferably align with the 
existing evidentiary framework that requires a challenger to 
disprove the PTO’s findings by clear and convincing evidence. 
A solution to this problem—and one that puts the issue of 
written description squarely back before the PTO, where the 
issue should be evaluated in the first place—is for applicants to 
affirmatively identify the written description support for their 
claims in the application and for the PTO to either approve or 
question the applicant’s statement of support. In this way, the 
PTO will necessarily provide a factual finding at the conclusion 
of prosecution, thus providing express reasoning to which 
courts may accord proper deference when a patent is 
challenged in litigation.99 
Asking applicants to identify support in their specification 
in prosecution has precedent. More specifically, an applicant 
who appeals a final rejection to the Board of Patent Appeals 
and Interferences (BPAI) must identify for the BPAI where the 
specification provides support for the claims on appeal.100 There 
is already rule-based support for this proposal. Title 37, section 
1.56 of the C.F.R. already requires that “[e]ach individual 
associated with the filing and prosecution of a patent 
application has a duty of candor and good faith in dealing with 
the Office, which includes a duty to disclose to the [PTO] all 
information known to that individual to be material to 
patentability.”101 Given the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112 
and the recent reaffirmation of the use of the written 
description requirement to police the “support” for new claims, 
it is difficult to imagine any information more “material” to the 
written description requirement for patentability than 
                                                          
 99. Am. Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359–60 
(Fed. Cir. 1984). 
 100. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(v) (2010) (requiring that an appellant’s opening 
brief to the BPAI include a “concise explanation of the subject matter defined 
in each of the independent claims involved in the appeal, which shall refer to 
the specification by page and line number, and to the drawing[s], if any, by 
reference characters”). 
 101. 37 C.F.R. § 1.56 (2010). 
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identification of the support for the claims at issue. 
A. BENEFITS 
By requiring applicants to affirmatively identify those 
sections of their specification and drawings that describe their 
claimed invention, the proposed solution brings more 
consistency and predictability to the patent process at both the 
prosecution and litigation stages. This yields benefits to patent 
applicants, patentees, and the public. 
First, the solution stands to reduce the number of 
overbroad patents. In a regime where an applicant must—from 
the outset of prosecution—identify the support for her claims, 
applicants will take care (1) to draft complete disclosures and 
(2) draft claims that are congruent with that disclosure. Patent 
applicants will be less likely to try and overreach with their 
claims because if they do, the applicants will have to justify—
during prosecution—how and why their claims are supported. 
With more patents being aligned to their disclosures, fewer 
patents with overbroad claims will result. This represents a 
positive outcome for the public, as there is a cost to society from 
overbroad patents.102 
A second benefit to patent applicants is that, once a patent 
is issued, the prosecution history of the patent will include 
express reasoning by the PTO on the issue of written 
description. This will in turn provide the courts with a PTO 
analysis to which the courts can more easily defer, as the PTO’s 
express reasoning will act as a psychological guidepost to 
courts.103 From the patent applicant’s perspective, this is a 
positive result, as applicants-turned-patentees will have more 
security that their patents will be accorded the proper respect 
in litigation. This will in turn encourage technology firms to 
seek patent protection, as they will have new confidence that a 
patent granted by the PTO will stand up to a litigation 
challenge. 
Having applicants provide a statement of written 
                                                          
 102. See, e.g., Benjamin K. Sovacool, Placing A Glove On The Invisible 
Hand: How Intellectual Property Rights May Impede Innovation In Energy 
Research And Development (R&D), 18 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 381, 406 (2008) 
(“Strong broad patent rights entail major economic costs while generating 
insufficient additional social benefits”) (citing Roberto Mazzoleni & Richard R. 
Nelson, The Benefits and Costs of Strong Patent Protection: A Contribution to 
the Current Debate, 27 RES. POL’Y 273, 281 (1998)). 
 103. Am. Hoist., 725 F.2d at 1360 . 
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description support to the PTO at the outset of prosecution is 
analogous to having applicants self-police. For self-policing to 
be effective, the actor in question must have a “positive 
incentive” to self-police.104 The proposed solution provides such 
a positive incentive: in return for self-policing and supplying 
the PTO with an affirmative statement of written description 
support, applicants will receive patents that are stronger in 
their written description compliance than under the current 
system. A litigant who challenges a patent must show where 
the PTO erred,105 and it will be more difficult to demonstrate 
such an error when the PTO has reviewed the applicant’s own 
affirmative representation of where support for the patent 
claims is found in the specification. 
The proposed solution also applies the emerging theory of 
behavioral economics106 to patent law. Under the behavior 
economics approach, actors are administratively “nudged” or 
otherwise impelled toward behaviors that ultimately benefit 
them. As one example of such an approach, employees may be 
automatically enrolled in a particular retirement plan so as to 
ensure that they save for retirement; employees who must 
affirmatively choose among multiple plans frequently fail to 
elect any plan and consequently save far less money for their 
retirements.107 
The proposed solution likewise nudges patent applicants 
toward a beneficial behavior by having applicants positively 
identify as part of the application process the location or 
locations in their specification that support their claimed 
invention. In this way, a minor adjustment to the patent 
application process stands to reduce the number of overbroad 
patents (conversely increasing the unclaimed subject matter 
available to others for further research) and reduce the number 
of granted patents that are invalidated during litigation. 
Applicants will then have greater confidence in the written 
description strength of their patents, which will in turn bring 
more predictability to invalidity challenges in patent litigation. 
                                                          
 104. Jay P. Kesan, Symposium: Innovations in Environmental Policy: 
Encouraging Firms to Police Them-Selves: Strategic Prescriptions to Promote 
Corporate Self-Auditing, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 155, 162 (2000). 
 105. Am. Hoist, 725 F.2d at 1360 . 
 106. See generally BARRY SCHWARTZ, THE PARADOX OF CHOICE (2004); 
CASS SUNSTEIN & RICHARD THALER, NUDGE (2008). 
 107. SCHWARTZ, supra note 106, at 27–29. 
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B. OBJECTIONS 
There are some objections to this proposed solution. First, 
the proposed solution may slow prosecution and make 
prosecution more costly.108 While applicants will undoubtedly 
bristle at the prospect of increased prosecution costs, that 
additional cost brings with it patents that should more easily 
withstand written description challenges in litigation. 
Second, patent examiners are already overburdened.109 
Tasking examiners with making express findings on written 
description in every case will undoubtedly increase that 
burden. But unless the PTO plans to hire additional examiners, 
this extra burden will be the trade-off for higher quality 
patents. 
Another objection is that the solution may cause inventors 
to limit themselves to patent claims drawn narrowly to the 
examples in the specification or to claim less than they could 
have, out of caution or out of interest in speeding prosecution. 
This objection need not prevent implementation of the proposed 
solution. 
First, while asking applicants to affirmatively identify the 
written description support for their claims could lead some 
applicants to narrow their claims, that is the choice of those 
applicants. Applicants who desire broader claims can simply 
draft an accordingly broad specification. Further, if an 
applicant receives patent claims she believes are narrower than 
the claims to which she believes she was entitled, the applicant 
can file a broadening reissue patent to secure the previously 
unclaimed subject matter.110 
Second, the concern that applicants’ claims will be limited 
to the embodiments of their invention that may be described in 
the “Examples” section of the patent application is misplaced 
because the law allows for claims that are broader than the 
examples. For example, in the chemical world, the Federal 
Circuit concluded en banc that a claim to a genus is proper 
when the specification “disclos[es] either a representative 
number of species falling within the scope of the genus or 
structural features common to the members of the genus so 
that one of skill in the art can ‘visualize or recognize’ the 
                                                          
 108. Sovacool, supra note 102, at 398. 
 109. E.g., Devlin, supra note 5, at 334–45. 
 110. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2006); Tillotson, Ltd. v. Walbro Corp., 831 F.2d 1033, 
1037 n.2 (Fed. Cir. 1987); see also MPEP § 1412.03. 
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members of the genus.”111 Thus, even under the proposed 
written description scheme, an applicant need not limit her 
claims to the examples set forth in their specification. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
While the written description requirement is barely an 
afterthought during patent prosecution,112 the fact that the 
requirement makes frequent and important appearances 
during litigation underscores the need to align the courts’ 
application of the doctrine during litigation with the PTO’s 
application of the doctrine during prosecution.113 
Proper application of the written description doctrine is 
challenging. First, the Federal Circuit’s development of the law 
surrounding the written description requirement has been 
turbulent114 and—in the view of some of the court’s own 
judges—is inconsistent with other areas of the court’s 
jurisprudence.115 Thus, the contours of the legal test for written 
description are ever-evolving.116 The proper level of deference to 
grant to the PTO’s written description conclusion and the 
evidentiary burden that the patent challenger must carry to 
invalidate a patent on written description grounds are also 
complex and difficult to apply.117 
But if applicants and the PTO are empowered to 
affirmatively frame and resolve written description issues at 
the earliest possible stage during prosecution, patentees could 
secure patents that are more likely to withstand litigation 
challenges. Having applicants affirmatively set forth their 
                                                          
 111. Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1350 (Fed. Cir. 
2010) (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 
1568–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 112. Crouch, supra note 8, at 396. 
 113. See supra Part IV. 
 114. LizardTech, Inc. v. Earth Res. Mapping, Inc., 433 F.3d 1373, 1376 
(Fed. Cir. 2006) (Rader, J., dissenting); Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & 
Co., Inc., 375 F.3d 1303, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (Rader, J., dissenting); MOBA, 
B.V. v. Diamond Automation, Inc., 325 F.3d 1306, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2003) 
(Rader, J., concurring); Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 
976, 987 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., dissenting) (criticizing application of 
written description requirement). 
 115. Ariad, 598 F.3d at 1361–67 (Rader, J., dissenting); LizardTech, 433 
F.3d at 1376 (Rader, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 116. See supra Part II.C. 
 117. See supra Part III. 
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written description support during prosecution would achieve 
this, as well as reduce the number of potentially harmful 
overbroad patents by encouraging applicants to align their 
patent claims with their specification at the earliest possible 
stage of the patent process. 
Introducing affirmative claim support statements into 
prosecution may not be a perfect remedy. The PTO is 
undeniably overburdened, and adding additional analysis to 
the patent prosecution process will not reduce that burden. 
Drafting affirmative statements of written description support 
may also increase prosecution costs for applicants. But a 
patenting process that produces solid patents and properly 
manages patentees’ expectations is worth investment from both 
the PTO and patent applicants. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
